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1
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2
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- The Kashmir Issue
- The Political/Diplomatic Options
- The Military Options
- Escalation Potential – At the Brink
- Strategic Costs
- Human Costs
- Economic Costs
- Risk Mitigation – Missile Defense
- Missile Defense Options
- Conclusions
- Q & A
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3
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- Jammu and Kashmir unresolved since 1947
- Pakistani intervention in 1990 has turned it into a “Nuclear Flashpoint”
- Any Indian attempts to defuse the situation – elections, ceasefire,
talks – scuttled by Pakistani military and ISI
- Lone killing, Continued killings of pro-India politicians
- Post-September 11 events failed to end Pakistan's sponsorship of Kashmir
terror
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4
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5
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- LOC -> International Border
- Greater Autonomy to J&K
- Trifurcation/Quadrification
- Abrogation of Article 370, full integration of state with India
- Independence/Ceding to Pakistan
- Intact Pakistan military establishment will never sign on to Option 1
through 4
- Option 5 will open the floodgates of secession movements and will
provide Jehadis a new base for further invasion of India
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6
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- Bilateral relations – embassy closings etc.
- Trade/treaties:
- Indus Water Treaty – Pakistan may regard abrogation as act of war
- Third party intervention – US “facilitation”
- US unwilling to press Pakistan
- All options so far used have failed
- US, Britain have accepted that terrorism is central issue
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7
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- Aim - Pinpoint strikes to destroy terror camps in POK
- At best will displace camps temporarily
- Pakistani terrorist infrastructure intact
- Infiltration will continue
- Few benefits, costs may be high – some danger of nuclear escalation
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8
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- Aim – Occupation of strategic areas in POK
- Could cut off most infiltration routes
- Provide India with buffer zone
- Will leave Pakistani military strength intact for future adventurism
- Other routes may be found – through Nepal, Bangladesh
- Is achievable within few days before western powers intervene (?)
- Higher danger of nuclear escalation
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9
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- Aims
- Significant Degradation of Pakistani Military
- Possible fragmentation of Pakistan
- De-nuclearization
- Taking back of entire POK
- Comprehensive solution to terrorism in South Asia
- Could eradicate Al Qaida in concert with US action in
Afghanistan/Western Pakistan
- Indian air superiority can be gained quickly, but ground action will lag
- Most difficult to achieve – may take too long to pre-empt international
intervention
- Nuclear escalation is extremely likely
- While benefits are high, costs without US support are very high also
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10
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- Limited incursion into POK appears to be the most effective cost-benefit
option
- Nuclear escalation is possible with any option, due to Pakistani
doctrine
- What is nuclear escalation?
- Why is India hesitant to use any military option?
- Nuclear delivery options
- Pak air force is weak, but missile armoury is not
- Even without a nuclear exchange, Pakistani missile armoury can create
significant losses to India within hours
- Pre-emptive Pakistani strike strong possibility in next few years, esp.
if J&K stays in India
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11
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- Missile attacks on air bases
- Air superiority can be neutralized in hours
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12
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- Hundreds of thousands could die in single nuclear attack on population
center
- Hundreds could die in conventional missile attack, but effects on morale
would be devastating considering India has not built shelters for
civilian population
- After-effects of multiple nuclear attacks on cities would be
catastrophic
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13
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- Successful nuclear missile attacks on Bombay, Bangalore, Delhi would set
India's economy back by decades
- Accurate conventional missile strikes on Bombay Stock Exchange, other
economic assets would be disastrous
- Economic and health effects could reverberate around the world
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14
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- After Persian Gulf War and attacks by Iraqi Scuds, Israel spent next
decade building an effective missile defense system
- The SDI-Star Wars debate in the US was sparked by a significant threat
of Soviet ICBMs
- Very little informed debate in India despite the clear and present
danger from Pakistani missiles
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15
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- No country has national missile defense
- Theater missile defense in place around Moscow and in Israel
- US forces use PAC-2/3 batteries
- Russian S-300/Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile system deployed in India
- Moderate effectiveness ~60% per interceptor vs. 30-50% for PAC-2/3
- Israeli Arrow ABM system much more effective ~90% (?) per interceptor
(not ready?)
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16
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17
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- Simplistic view of Theater Anti-Missile Defense (TAMD) architecture
- Percentage protection of each asset is function of interceptor
effectiveness and number of interceptors assigned per expected enemy
missile: LR = (1 – Pk)n
- LR = Leakage Rate, Pk
= Probability of kill by interceptor,
- n = number of interceptors used
per missile
- For example, might want to achieve 99% protection of population centers,
94% protection of air bases
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18
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- Assume Pakistan has ~100 missiles
- For protecting Delhi, Bombay and
Bangalore with 99% certainty, need 300 Russian S-300 interceptors, or 70
Israeli Arrow interceptors.
- For protecting 10 air bases with 94% certainty, need 300 Russian
interceptors, or 100 Israeli Arrow interceptors
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19
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20
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21
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- For such a sample TAMD deployment the cost is ~$600 million for Russian
S-300 or ~$200 million for Israeli Arrow-2 system
- Compare to hundreds of millions of dollars spent on deployment and
counter-insurgency operations per month by India
- Goal is not to arrive at exact figures, but to generate a debate on what
it will cost India to protect itself and to break Pakistan's terrorist
stranglehold of J&K
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22
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- Kashmir problem is a set of complex issues, but root is in the
terrorism/fundamentalism export from Pakistan
- Political solutions are more suited to local Muslim demands vs.
aspirations of Jammu, Ladakh, and Kashmiri Hindus
- “Facilitation” will not solve the issues
- Terrorism solution is unlikely without
military action
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23
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- Pakistani ballistic missiles expose India to grave nuclear and
conventional threat, neutralize India's air superiority
- Lack of informed debate in India on immediate need for theater
anti-missile defense is troubling
- Cost may be in hundreds of millions – compare to continuing costs of
J&K counter-insurgency and Pak confrontation
- TAMD may be answer to Pakistani nuclear blackmail and a crucial
component of military action to end Kashmir terrorism
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24
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25
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